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Abstract
Why, how, and under what conditions do moral beliefs persist despite institutional pres-
sure for change? Why do the powerful often fail to promote the morality of their authority?
This paper addresses these questions by presenting the role of crypto-morality in moral per-
sistence. Crypto-morality is the secret adherence to one morality while practicing another in
public. A simple overlapping generations model is developed to examine the conditions under
which crypto-morality is practiced, decays and inﬂuences the direction of moral change. We
demonstrate the empirical relevance of crypto-morality by discussing the moral foundations
of political legitimacy in various historical episodes.
JEL classiﬁcations D02, D10, D82, N30, N40, P16
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1S a m u e l1 6 : 7
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Moral standards — internalized rules of behavior from which deviations are psychologically costly —
inﬂuence economic outcomes.1 Moreover, moral standards (or beliefs) are surprisingly persistent
in hostile institutional environments. Communism, for example, failed in using force to eradicate
the Russian Orthodox Church or to eliminate national identities in the Eastern block. How and
under what conditions do past moral beliefs persist in hostile institutional environments? What
factors limit the use of coercive power and economic rewards to inﬂuence moral evolution?
This paper argues that people strategically respond to institutional pressure by practicing
crypto-morality. (“Crypto” from “kryptein”, Greek for “to hide.”)2 They pretend to hold the
institutionally sanctioned moral belief (or morality for short), while secretly holding and trans-
mitting another morality to their children. Once the institutional repression ceases, the morality
that was secretly held manifests itself.
Crypto-morality is widely practiced.3 It contributes to the survival of political opposition
in dictatorial regimes, to the perpetuation of illegal racism and sexism in modern democracies,
and to the persistence of religious minorities. For example, in Catholicism one condition for
forgiveness of a sin is that it was neither deliberate nor made with complete consent. The principle
of Taqiyya in the Shia theology goes even further and explicitly allows believers to conceal their
faith when under threat, persecution or compulsion. The practice of crypto-morality has enabled
illegal moral standards to persist for centuries. For example, belief in reincarnation is atypical
for Islam but prevails in some Islamic sects including the one million strong Druze community.
For this and other reasons, these sects have often been considered heterodox or even heretical
but nevertheless survived in the Islamic world while concealing their true beliefs.4
How exactly does crypto-morality work? Under what conditions is it eﬀective? This paper
develops a simple choice-theoretic, overlapping generations model to address these questions.
The model’s usefulness is illustrated by applying it to study political legitimacy.
Our model of crypto-morality is developed in Section 2. It follows the seminal work of Bisin
and Verdier (2000, 2001) on socialization, which is the process through which moral beliefs are
1E.g., North 1990; Platteau 1994; Greif 1994, 2006; Roland 2004; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2006; Tabellini
2008a. This particular deﬁnition of morality is taken from Greif 2010.
2Institutions here are coercively enforced rules. For a broader deﬁnitions of institutions, see Greif 1998, 2006;
Hogdson 2006, or Aoki 2001.
3Wikipedia lists Crypto-Anarchism, Crypto-Bismarckian, Crypto-Calvinism, Crypto-Christianity, Crypto-
Judaism, Crypto-Muslims, Crypto-Nazism, Crypto-Paganism, Crypto-Christianity, Crypto-Communism, Crypto-
fascism, and Crypto-politics.
4Encyclop dia Britannica Online. 2010. “Druze” and “’uqqal.” accessed 10 July 2010
<http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9031268>,
<http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9074409>.
1transmitted and internalized by individuals. In their model, moral beliefs are transmitted to
children by their parents and are inﬂuenced by their prevalence in the society. Parents exhibit
“imperfect empathy:” they evaluate the utility implications of their children’s future actions based
on their (the parents’) morality. Parental socialization is a costly investment, which increases
the probability that a child would have his parent’s morality. A lower investment increases the
probability that a child will have the morality held by the majority of the population. As a
consequence, a parent whose morality is held by a minority has an incentive to invest heavily in
socialization, which in turn strengthens the minority’s morality. It follows that, under reason-
able regularity conditions, endogenous investment in socialization results in equilibrium moral
diversity.
This approach helps explain the persistence of cultural minorities, but it does not explain
moral persistence in hostile institutional environments. To substantiate this claim, we expand
the Bisin and Verdier model to introduce a hostile authority who can impose penalties on those
who don’t follow the authority’s preferred morality. This authority can be, for example, a new
political regime, a religion that gains political power, a dictator who wishes to perpetuate his
dynastic control, or even a new management attempting to alter a company’s culture. We
then show that if the penalty is suﬃciently high then all parents will socialize their children
to conform with the authority’s preferred morality, resulting in a moral transition. Hence, the
analysis highlights the need to explain why authorities fail to implement their preferred morality
in equilibrium.
To address this, we introduce crypto-morality into the analysis. This is modeled by de-
coupling the behavior of individuals from their morality. We allow individuals to behave in ways
that contradict their morality, while still transmitting it to their children. Behaving in this way
results in costs and beneﬁts. The costs are a result of deviating from one’s morality. The beneﬁts
come from reducing the likelihood of a penalty. When crypto-morality is adopted, this results in
a behavioral transition in which people behave as if they had adopted the authority’s preferred
morality, yet a moral transition does not transpire.
We examine, among other issues, conditions under which crypto-morality will be chosen over
adopting the authority’s preferred morality, or over the original morality. We ﬁrst analyze the
case in which crypto-morality is not detectable. If penalties are suﬃciently low, then choosing
the original moral action and incurring the penalty is preferred to the utility loss from practicing
crypto-morality. When the penalties are relatively high, crypto-morality is the preferred action.
The analysis is generalized to the case where crypto-morality is detected with a positive proba-
bility. It is still the case that an increase in penalties will lead to a behavioral transition and not
a moral transition when the probability of detection is not too high. What is more surprising is
that given a penalty that is not too high, an increase in the probability of detection will cause
previously crypto-moral individuals to choose their original moral action.
We also explore the use of schooling, or indoctrination, as an alternative mechanism to induce
a moral transition. We model the implementation of a centralized schooling system as an institu-
2tion that changes the probability of socialization to the authority’s preferred morality. We show
that on one hand, this mechanism is more eﬀective in causing a moral transition since it does
induce crypto-morality. On the other hand, however, the moral transition is slower to transpire
as compared to a high enough expected penalty.
From the authority’s perspective, if the probability of detection is higher, then the attractive-
ness of coercive penalties increases as compared to schooling. However, the relative attractiveness
of schooling will change over time endogenously as a function of the composition of moralities in
society. In particular, if detection is not perfect so that sometimes “false positive” identiﬁcation
of transgressors occurs, then as the moral transition transpires, the attractiveness of using coer-
cive penalties decreases. As a result, the authority will abolish the coercive institutions, possibly
in favor of other means of indoctrination.
We illustrate the importance of crypto-morality in moral persistence in Section 3 by discussing
the signiﬁcant, yet theoretically challenging issue of political legitimacy. We deﬁne legitimacy of a
political authority as the extent to which people feel morally obliged to follow the authority (Greif
2010). Clearly, political legitimacy is valuable because, as Max Weber has noted, it increases
the likelihood of staying in power, ceteris paribus. Even a dictator prefers that he would be
considered the only morally accepted ruler. Similarly, a democratically elected president prefers
that his party’s ideology would become the only morally accepted one. Hence, when a new
political authority comes to power, it may beneﬁt from a moral transition to enhance its political
legitimacy.
Speciﬁcally, we consider three episodes of new political authorities. The ﬁrst is the con-
solidation of the Spanish monarchy following the Reconquista of Spain from the Muslims. We
demonstrate that the mechanisms utilized to enhance political legitimacy of the new regime,
particularly the Spanish Inquisition, are consistent with our theoretical analysis. In addition,
we argue through the lens of our analysis that the decline of the Spanish Inquisition in the
19th century transpired when indoctrination, rather than force, became more eﬀective in moral
transitions. We then compare the educational reforms in the French and Turkish Republics
and demonstrate that their relative success is consistent with our analysis. Finally, we present
evidence for the persistence of the moral basis of political legitimacy in China and the Mid-
dle East. This last piece of evidence illustrates that the high cost of detecting and eradicating
crypto-morality induced rulers to conform to the prevailing legitimacy norms.
There are many useful economic models of morality but none captures the main features of
crypto-morality.5 The “preference falsiﬁcation” framework dominates the analysis of the relation-
ship between a penalizing authority and the preferences and actions of individuals (e.g., Kuran
1991).6 The main idea of this framework is that the authority penalizes public expressions of an
5Frank (1987) presents an insightful evolutionary model of how genetic capacity to credibly signal morality
(honesty) evolves. Tabellini (2008) examines the conditions leading to general and limited morality. Other models
such as Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Iannaccone (1992) consider the consumption value of moral goods and
the value of the public goods usually oﬀered by moral fellows.
6Rubin (2009) also looks at the role that institutionalized penalties play in encouraging people to choose actions
3individual’s beliefs in order to prevent other individuals from updating their own beliefs about
the authority’s conduct. A by-product of the authority’s success in preventing public expressions
of negative private information is its eﬀect on preferences. “People rely on the prevailing climate
of opinion in developing the personal belief systems that underlie their private policy preferences.
With this climate being formed by the justiﬁcations oﬀered for preferences expressed publicly, it
turns out that a by-product of preference falsiﬁcation may be a shift in the distribution of pri-
vate preferences in favour of the status quo” (Kuran 1987: 642-3). In contrast, in our framework
the initial distribution of preferences is known and the penalty is aimed at changing preferences
rather then preventing the diﬀusion of information about it.
2 Socialization in a Hostile Institutional Environment
We begin with a simple overlapping generations model of socialization that closely follows the
inspiring work of Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001). The benchmark model in section 2.1 restates
their main insights and sets the stage for the extensions we consider in later sections of the paper.
2.1 Benchmark: Socialization and Moral Heterogeneity
In each generation there is a continuum of agents and each lives for two periods, ﬁrst as a child
and then as a parent. Each parent has exactly one oﬀspring, making the population stationary
(normalized to one). There are two possible “moralities,” or types: m ∈ {a,b} and two possible
actions, x ∈ {a,b}.L e t t i n g um
x denote the utility of type m from action x,w ea s s u m et h a t
um
m >u m
n , n 6= m. Hence, morality is synonymous with preferences over actions where an a
morality person prefers action a while a b morality person prefers action b. W es i m p l i f yb y
making preferences symmetric and assume that ua
a = ub
b = u and ua
b = ub
a = u.
The transmission of moral preferences occurs through social learning. Children are born
without well-deﬁned moralities, and they acquire moral preferences through the inﬂuence of
their parents, often referred to as “vertical transmission,” and through the inﬂuence of the gen-
eral population, often referred to as “oblique transmission”. Parents purposefully attempt at
socializing their children, despite the costs they incur in the process.
A parent is motivated to socialize his child because each parent is altruistic, but in a limited
way. Namely, parents perceive the welfare of their children only through the ﬁlter of their
own preferences. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) call this particular form of myopia “imperfect
empathy”. It’s result is that parents always want to socialize their children to their own morality.
In Bisin and Verdier’s models, a parent cares about the choice of their child and not directly
about the preferences of the child. As we will see later in section 2.2, this distinction is neither
important in the models that Bisin and Verdier analyze, nor in our benchmark model, but it will
play a role later in our analysis.
diverging from their preferences focusing on social eﬀects.
4A child’s socialization occurs in two steps. First, a parent of type m decides how much to
invest in socializing his child. We denote this investment by τm, and the child adopts his parent’s
morality with probability τm. With probability 1−τm,h o w e v e r ,t h ep a r e n t ’ se ﬀorts fail and the
child is matched randomly with an individual of the old generation and adopts their morality.
More precisely, let qt denote the proportion of a types in the population at time t and let
Pmn denote the probability that a parent of morality m has a child that adopts morality n.I t
follows that:
Paa = τa +( 1− τa)qt Pab =( 1− τa)(1 − qt)
Pbb = τb +( 1− τb)(1 − qt) Pba =( 1− τb)qt
(1)
It then follows that the fraction qt+1 of adult individuals of type a in period t +1is:
qt+1 = qtPaa +( 1− qt)Pba (2)
= qt + qt(1 − qt)(τa − τb)
where the second equality follows from simple algebra.
Turning to the parent’s choice to socialize their child, let H(τm) denote the cost of social-
ization eﬀort τm. We assume that H(τm) is convex and guaranties an interior solution to the
parent’s problem by assuming standard Inada conditions: H0 ≥ 0, H00 > 0, H0(0) = 0 and
limτm→1 H0(τm)=∞. Assuming no discounting, and that a child of morality m will choose
action m (which is what his m-type parent wants), each parent with morality m will choose τm
to maximize,
Um = Pmmu + Pmnu − H(τm) . (3)
It follows from (1) and (3) that a parent of morality a chooses τa to maximize,
Ua =[ τa +( 1− τa)qt]u +( 1− τa)(1 − qt)u − H(τa) (4)
= u + qt∆u + τa(1 − qt)∆u − H(τa) ,
where ∆u ≡ u−u denotes the beneﬁt from having a child choose the parent’s preferred action.7
The problem (4) has a unique solution given by the ﬁrst order condition (FOC),
H0(τa)=( 1− qt)∆u. (5)
The FOC (5) has a simple economic interpretation. The left-hand side is the marginal cost
of extra parent-socialization, while the right-hand side is the marginal expected beneﬁt. To see
this, notice from the second line of (4) that at the margin, an incremental increase in parent
socialization makes a child who would have been obliquely socialized by society to have morality
b, which happens with probability (1 − qt), obtain morality a and choose a over b, yielding a
beneﬁto f∆u.
7Bisin and Verdier (2001) refer to ∆u as “cultural intolerance.” We refrain from using this term.
5In a similar way, the FOC of a parent with morality b is,
H0(τb)=qt∆u. (6)
As the FOCs show, the incentives of a parent of type m to socialize their child decreases with
the proportion of parents who have the same morality. (Bisin and Verdier (2001) refer to this
property as “cultural substitution”.) This follows simply from the fact that oblique socialization
substitutes for parental (vertical) socialization. This in turn implies that if both moralities are
represented in society then as one group becomes smaller, the intensity of vertical socialization
increases, causing that morality to become more prevalent. This observation, together with the
transition function in (2) implies that there will be an interior steady state equilibrium (SSE) q∗
in which the size of each morality group remains constant.
More precisely, since a SSE is characterized by qt = qt+1 ≡ q∗, the transition function in (2)
implies that in a SSE,
qt(1 − qt)(τa − τb)=0 , (7)
which can be satisﬁed in one of three ways. Two are the extreme SSE where there is a homogenous
society with one morality, a (where q∗ =1 )o rb (where q∗ =0 ), no parent chooses to socialize
their child, and all socialization is oblique. The third is a unique interior SSE with a heterogeneous
population, in which (7) must be satisﬁed by setting τa = τb so that the two morally distinct
groups invest the same amount of socialization. (As Bisin and Verdier show, the interior SSE is
also the globally table equilibrium.) This, together with the two FOC’s (5) and (6), generates
the unique interior SSE. Namely,
Lemma 1: There is a unique interior SSE in which q∗ = 1
2 and H0(τa)=H0(τb)=∆u
2 resulting
in τa = τb = τ∗.
The conclusion above mirror’s Proposition 1 in Bisin and Verdier (2001) and is depicted in
Figure 1. The three SSEs are at 0, at q∗ and at 1. If the population is at some qt = q0 <q ∗
then the a parents socialize more vigorously than the b parents who enjoy the eﬀects of a large
group, and as a result qt+1(q0) >q 0, and over time the population converges to q∗ from below.
The reverse happens if qt = q00 >q ∗.T h ef a c tt h a tq∗ = 1





a = ∆u but qualitatively the result is general.8
2 . 2 C o e r c i v eC h a n g e :T h eR o l eo fP e n a l t i e s
In what follows, we extend the simple framework outlined above to include a ruler who wishes
to change the composition of society. In particular, the ruler wishes to eradicate morality a from
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Population Dynamics and SSE
the population, or at least to reduce it suﬃciently, so we can think of the ruler’s preferences being
decreasing in qt in any given period t.
We ﬁrst consider the role of penalties imposed by the ruler that are aimed at discouraging
morality a. We assume that the ruler, and the institutions representing him, cannot directly
observe a person’s morality. Hence, the penalt yc a no n l yb ei m p o s e do nt h ec h o i c eo fa c t i o na,
which reveals a person with morality a.
Let π denote the penalty imposed as measured in utility. Clearly, if π>∆u then a child
of type a will choose b over a given the large penalty. Since parents have imperfect-empathy
preferences over the choices made by their children, a parent of type a will choose not to socialize
its child. As a result, starting from any qt ∈ (0,1), population dynamics will evolve towards
limt→∞ qt =0 . Also note that no penalties will occur on the equilibrium path.
If, however, the ruler is limited by the extent to which he can penalize people, say by some
highest penalty π<∆u, then a-type children will choose a over b because u−π>u , and parents
still beneﬁt from socializing their children. However, the beneﬁts from socialization of a-type
parents are smaller, as their objective function now becomes,
Ua =[ τa +( 1− τa)qt](u − π)+( 1− τa)(1 − qt)u − H(τa)
which has a unique solution given by the FOC,
H0(τa)=( 1− qt)(∆u − π) , (8)
7and in a similar way the FOC of a b-type parent is,
H0(τb)=qt(∆u + π)) . (9)
This changes the new SSE to which the population will converge as follows:
Proposition 1: Given a penalty π<∆u, the unique interior SSE is characterized by (8), (9)
and by qπ = ∆u−π
2∆u <q ∗,a n dH0(τa)=H0(τb)=
(∆u)2−π2
2∆u resulting in τa = τb <τ ∗.
Furthermore, qπ is decreasing in the penalty π and for any ﬁxed π, qπ approaches q∗ as
∆u →∞ .
The intuition for Proposition 1 is simple: a penalty reduces the beneﬁt of choosing action a,
which in turn reduces the return from having a child with morality a. This makes socialization
less attractive for a-type parents and more attractive for b-type parents, implying that the SSE
with a penalty must have less a-types than the SSE without a penalty. Furthermore, the SSE
level qπ decreases in π because higher penalties make a socialization less attractive. Last, as
∆u increases, the eﬀect of any ﬁxed penalty decreases, and at the limit the penalty becomes
ineﬀective.
Two issues are worth discussing further. First, if society starts at the original SSE then
imposing a penalty π<∆u starting at some date causes an immediate drop in socialization
to morality a, and an increase in socialization to morality b. However, heterogeneity will be
preserved and a-types will persist, but society converges to a smaller fraction with morality a.
As such, penalties move society towards a more desirable outcome for the ruler.
Second, we have ignored the cost-side of imposing penalties. The reason for this is that
there can be both costs and beneﬁts to institutions that impose penalties. If, for example, the
penalties include expropriation of wealth and assets, these may cover some or all of the costs of
institutionalizing penalties. As such, it is not clear how attractive penalties may be. In section 2.6
we discuss some of the costs of imposing penalties that have more precise empirical implications.
2.3 Directed Change: The role of Schooling
Imposing penalties on the undesirable behavior is only one way in which the ruler can change
behavior, and ultimately morality. Another way would be to try and directly intervene in the
socialization process. A common way to do this is to introduce centralized schooling which is
aimed at socializing children to the desired b morality, thus directly aﬀecting their preferences.
In the setup of our model schooling can be thought of as tilting the process of oblique social-
ization in favor of b morality above and beyond the current proportion of the population that
is of b morality. Formally, let σ ∈ [0,1] denote the eﬀectiveness of school indoctrination. The
probability that a child who was not socialized by his parent adopts the a morality in period t
is now (1 − σ)qt (and it is 1 − (1 − σ)qt for the b morality). That is, the more eﬀective school
indoctrination is (higher σ), the less likely it is that oblique socialization will result in a morality.
8For simplicity, we take an extreme version of this idea and assume that if parental (vertical)
socialization fails, which happens with probability 1 − τm for morality m, then the child is
socialized to the b morality with probability 1. That is, we are setting σ =1so that schooling
perfectly indoctrinates those who were not socialized by their parent.9 This trivially changes the
transition probabilities deﬁned in (1) above as follows: Paa = τa,P ab =1− τa,P bb =1and
Pba =0 . Also, the transition dynamics equation becomes
qt+1 = τaqt. (10)
Turning to the objective of a parent with morality a, he maximizes,
Ua = τau +( 1− τa)u − H(τa)
which has a unique solution given by the FOC,
H0(τa)=∆u. (11)
We then have,
Proposition 2: If schooling is implemented starting in some period t then there is a discontinu-
ous increase in τa,w h i c ht h e ns t a y sﬁxed over time, while τb =0thereafter. Furthermore,
the proportion of a morality types slowly shrinks with limt→∞ qt =0 .
In the case of perfectly eﬀective schooling, the FOC in (11) is independent of qt,a n di ti s
easy to see that the marginal beneﬁt of parent socialization is higher since there is no oblique
socialization to a morality. For this reason the endogenous response of parents to schooling is to
increase the level of parental socialization τa.T h i sa c t sa sa ni n i t i a ld a m p e ro nt h ee ﬀectiveness
of education, which is contrary to a penalty where parental socialization drops as a response to
ap e n a l t y .
2.4 Crypto-morality and Moral Persistence
As we discuss in the introduction, coercive penalties on actions may induce crypto-morality,
deﬁned as the secret adherence to one morality while practicing another in public. This incorpo-
rates the idea that in private, which naturally includes the conﬁnes of one’s family, a person can
share his beliefs and act upon them. If, however, public display of these beliefs and corresponding
actions that reveal them will result in penalties, then a person will act diﬀerently in public to
avoid the penalty.
In the setup of our model this can be interpreted as introducing a third action c,w h i c h
corresponds to choosing b in public settings while choosing a in private. Naturally, we assume
9Lower levels of σ>0 will result in similar qualitative results in the spirit of Proposition 2, but the proportion
of a morality types will not go to zero as stated in the proposition.
9that for moral types m, the utility from choosing c satisﬁes um
m >u m
c >u m
n , m,n ∈ {a,b} m 6= n.
In particular, we assume that for some φ ∈ [0,1],u a
c = φu +( 1− φ)u and ub
c =( 1− φ)u + φu.
This asymmetry between a and b moralities vis-a-vis action c allows us to interpret φ as the
importance of private actions. Namely, as φ → 1,a c t i o na that is done in private when c is
chosen receives more weight. We say that private actions become more important as φ → 1.
Of course, no b-type person will choose a in private or in public, implying that every b-type
continues to choose b.D e ﬁne πc ≡ u − ua
c = ∆u(1 − φ) ≥ 0, as the minimum penalty needed to
induce an a-type to choose c instead of a. Assume that πc < π<∆u, and recall that π is the
highest penalty available to the ruler. This implies that for penalties π ∈ (πc,π] an a-type will
choose c, but for lower penalties he will choose a.W et h u sh a v e ,
Corollary 1: If the penalty is small satisfying π ≤ πc then the unique interior SSE following
the penalty is characterized by Proposition 1.
This follows immediately from the fact that with a penalty π ≤ πc the a-types will continue to
choose a always and crypto-morality will not emerge. With higher penalties π ∈ (πc,π], however,
a-types will choose c because ua
c > u − π>u . The objective function of an a-type parent now
becomes,
Ua =[ τa +( 1− τa)qt]ua
c +( 1− τa)(1 − qt)u − H(τa) (12)
= u + φqt∆u + φτa − φτa(1 − qt)∆u.
Note that a parent’s utility is deﬁned over the actions that a child takes and not the child’s
morality. In our setting, however, actions are based on morality, and as such, a child’s morality
indirectly aﬀects its parent’s utility. For this reason there is no need to introduce a direct
preference over a child’s morality, and doing so will be redundant. The parent’s objective function
has a unique solution given by the FOC,
H0(τa)=φ(1 − qt)∆u, (13)
and in a similar way the FOC of a b-type parent is,
H0(τb)=φqt∆u. (14)
This changes the new SSE to which the population will converge as follows:
Proposition 3: If the penalty is not small and satisﬁes π ∈ (πc,π] then the unique interior
SSE is characterized by qc = q∗ = 1
2. Furthermore, H0(τa)=H0(τb)=φ∆u
2 resulting in
τa = τb <τ ∗,a n da sφ → 1 both converge to τ∗.
This stark result suggests that if the penalty is high enough to cause crypto-morality then
the SSE proportion of a-types will remain the same as with no punishments and at the same
time both a and b morality parents will socialize their children less than in the benchmark case
10with no penalties. The intuition for the lower level of parental socialization is that having the
option of crypto-morality makes oblique socialization to the other morality less severe for both
types. The reason that qc = q∗ follows from the fact that this eﬀe c ti st h es a m ef o rb o t ht y p e s ,
so the drop in parental socialization for both types is a wash. The fact that qc = q∗ rests on
our speciﬁcation of um
c as described above where the importance of private actions is symmetric.
However, a more general treatment shows that qc can be either smaller or larger than q∗,t h e
benchmark SSE.10
The upshot of Corollary 1 and Proposition 3 is that if crypto-morality is possible, then
penalties have a non-monotonic eﬀect. Small penalties will slightly reduce the prevalence of
morality a, but imposing penalties that are high enough to discourage the choice of a may not
at all reduce the prevalence of a morality. Furthermore, if crypto-morality is adopted then once
the penalty is removed, action a is immediately picked up by the population. This diﬀers from
the case of penalties without crypto-morality where a penalty causes the prevalence of action a
to drop, and after the penalty is removed it takes time for the population to get back to the
benchmark SSE q∗.
2.5 Crypto-morality and Imperfect Exposure
In the previous section we argued that crypto-morality will undermine a ruler’s ability to erad-
icate, or even decrease the prevalence of morality a. In this section we introduce the notion of
imperfect exposure of individuals who choose action c. In particular, assume that if a person
chooses action c then with some probability e ∈ (0,1) he is exposed as following crypto-morality
(e.g., through a network of informants.) Once exposed the penalty π is imposed on the individ-
ual. Hence, section 2.2 above is the special case where e =1and section 2.4 studies the case of
e =0 .
In this setup choosing a imposes the penalty π for sure, while choosing c imposes the penalty
with probability e<1. Hence, an a morality individual will be indiﬀerent between a and c if
and only if,
u − π = φu +( 1− φ)u − eπ .
Simple algebra shows that this is satisﬁed for a penalty πe =
∆u(1−φ)
1−e = πc
1−e >π c.T h a ti s ,
if π<π e then an a morality individual chooses a, while if π>π e then an a morality individual
chooses c. However, unlike the case of e =0 , crypto-morality comes with a positive expected
penalty, eπ, and as a consequence we have,
Proposition 4: If the penalty is small satisfying π ≤ πe then the unique interior SSE following
the penalty is characterized by Proposition 1. If the penalty is not small and satisﬁes
10For example, if in a linear speciﬁcation as above the importance of private actions is asymmetric with φa 6= φb,
then qc ≷ q∗ if and only if φa ≶ φb. The linear speciﬁcation is without loss since there are only two actions a and
b so um
c is always a convex combination of um
a and um
b .
11Figure 2: The Best Response of a-types
π ∈ (πe,π] then the unique interior SSE is characterized by qe = ∆u−eπ
2∆u = eqπ +(1−e)q∗.
Furthermore, H0(τa)=H0(τb)=φ
(∆u−eπ)(∆u+eπ)
2∆u resulting in τa = τb <τ ∗.
Not surprisingly, when crypto-morality is practiced and there is some positive probability
of exposure then the analysis results in a SSE that lies between q∗ and qπ, where as exposure
increases from 0 to 1 the SSE proportion of a morality individuals drops from q∗ to qπ.
The ruler’s coercive institution can described by two parameters: π and e. The behavior of
individuals will be a function of these two parameters, and the equilibrium behavior is depicted in
Figure 2. The three dashed lines represent indiﬀerent lines in the (π,e) space. First, when π<π
then a is preferred to b and vice versa, so that the line a ∼ b shows where there is indiﬀerence. To
the left of the line labeled a ∼ c, a is preferred to c and the opposite occurs to the left (this line
is derived from (??) above). Similarly, to the left of the line labeled c ∼ b, c is preferred to b and
the opposite occurs to the left (this line is derived from φu+(1−φ)u−eπ = u). Hence, the heavy
lines delineate the regions where the action chosen is a,b or c. The gray region includes all values
of (π,e) for which an a parent socializes his child in the same way, while the remaining blank
shows the values for which a complete moral transition occurs, in which no a parents socialize
their children.
2.6 Extensions and Implications of the Model
The model of socialization that we use can be extended in several ways to account for a more
rich and reﬁned set of observations.
12Heterogeneous values: We assumed above that u and u were the same for all individuals,
implying that the strength of individual moralities is identical across people. Imagine
instead that there is heterogeneity in that some people have “stronger” convictions than
others. A simple way to model this would be to ﬁx u while allowing u to be distributed
on some interval [uL,u H] with some distribution F(·). A parent’s objective function is the
same as described in the various sections above, but now ∆u, the main component in the
marginal beneﬁt of socialization, varies across individuals. It is easy to see that parents with
stronger convictions, measured by higher values of ∆u, will invest more in socialization,
and will require a higher penalty to abandon their morel choice. As a consequence, diﬀerent
people will respond diﬀerently to penalties. For example, a increase in penalties will cause
some people to stick to their moral choices while others will adopt crypto-morality, and
a third group will switch moralities altogether. Hence, a drop in penalties will not easily
restore the population to its previous condition.
Cryptomorality Decay: In our analysis of crypto-morality in sections 2.4 and 2.5 we used the
transition dynamics described in equation (2). This basically assumes that when crypto-
morality is practiced, then a child who was not socialized by their parent will be socialized
to a morality with a probability equal to the proportion of the population with a morality,
even if they do not choose a in public. Arguably, this assumption is not realistic since a
types who choose crypto-morality behave like b types, implying that oblique socialization
should be tilted towards b morality, similarly to the case of schooling. This implies that
decay in a socialization may in the long run lead to the slow disappearance of a morality.
Endogenous Costs of Exposure: In the analysis above we ignored the ruler’s cost of imple-
menting either penalties or schooling. Clearly, a large state-run education institution will
have costs, yet if education also adds some skills above and beyond indoctrination, there
are returns as well to economic growth. Similarly, imposing penalties has costs and beneﬁts
since the enforcing institutions can conﬁscate the wealth of those individuals who are penal-
ized and use that to fund some or all of the activities. However, there is a cost to penalties
that is endogenous to socialization that arises from the existence of crypto-morality. For
example, there may be some probability μ of falsely accusing a b-type of being an a type
who practices crypto-morality. We would expect that both the intensity of true exposure e
and of false accusations μ will depend on the institutions used by the ruler. It is reasonable
to expect that more vigorous persecutions will result in higher values of e, making crypto-
morality more detectable. If, however, we also assume that more vigorous persecution will
result in more false accusations and convictions (higher values of μ) then an endogenous cost
of using coercive penalties arises. In particular, as a moral transition transpires, and the
proportion of a-types drops, then the endogenous costs of coercive penalties rises due to an
increase in the relative likelihood of false accusations. If this is indeed a cost of persecution
then at some point, even if the ruler believes that some a-types are still present, the level
13of persecution would decrease due to the costs of false accusations. In fact, the coercive
institution may be abolished altogether in favor of other mechanisms such as schooling.
3 Crypto-morality and Political Legitimacy
This section illustrates the importance of crypto-morality in moral persistence by discussing
political legitimacy. We deﬁne political legitimacy of a political authority — a ruler or a political
elite — as the extent to which people feel morally obliged to follow the authority (Greif 2001).
Political legitimacy is valuable because, as Max Weber has noted, it increases the likelihood of
staying in power, ceteris paribus.11
When a new political authority comes to power, it can beneﬁt from instituting new moral
standards of political legitimacy. Even if, for example, military dictatorship is legitimate, the
current dictator prefers that he would be considered the only morally accepted ruler. Similarly, a
democratically elected president prefers that his party’s ideology would become the only morally
accepted one. Using the terms of our model, if a new political authority prefers b to a then its
political legitimacy is higher if the proportion of individuals of morality b is higher.
The Spanish inquisition (1478-1834) is perhaps the best known case in which force was sys-
tematically used, over a long period of time, to alter morality. Although it operated against
religious heresy, it was also a means for nation-building by the Spanish monarchy. Its history
illustrates the importance of crypto-morality. In particular, it illustrates that despite its slow
decay in a hostile institutional environment, forbidden morality can last for centuries.
The decline of the Inquisition in the 19th century transpired when indoctrination, rather than
force, became more eﬀective in moral transitions. Since then, indoctrination was indeed used
by newly created Republics to foster their legitimacy. We thus consider the educational reforms
in the French and Turkish Republics and demonstrate that the outcomes of these reforms are
consistent with our analysis. In particular, that increase in parental socialization can counter
oblique socialization. Finally, we present evidence for the persistence of the moral basis of political
legitimacy in China and the Middle East. These cases illustrate that the high cost of detecting
and eradicating crypto-morality induced rulers to conform to the prevailing legitimacy norms.
3.1 The Spanish Inquisition
Pre-modern Christian rulers in the Iberian peninsula faced the challenge of consolidating control
over areas that were under Muslim rule since the 8th century. They responded to this challenge by
promoting religious uniformity. Although, in general, the papacy in pre-modern Catholic Europe
had adjudication over heresy, the Spanish monarchy gained Papal approval to have this authority
11Legitimacy is hardly discussed in contemporary political science and political economy. For example, the term
‘legitimacy’ has only six index entries and very little discussion in the New Handbook of Political Science (Goodin
and Klingemann 1996). For some recent analyses, see Levi 1997; Gilley 2006, Zhao 2009; Greif 2010.
14in 1478.12 The monarchy created the infamous Spanish Inquisition to promote Catholicism for
the beneﬁt of the Church and the consolidation of a Catholic state.13 The Inquisition lasted until
1834, particularly due to its political role in a state that initially had large Muslim and Jewish
populations. During that time, the Inquisition grew to be a very powerful organization. From
1540 to 1700 alone it accused more than 44,000 individuals of heresy, punished most of them,
and sentenced over 800 to death (Rawlings 2006, p. 13). Throughout its history, it may have
convicted more than 290,000 individuals and condemned more than 31,000 to burn on the stake
(in addition to more than 17,000 who were burned in eﬃgy (Roth 1996, p. 123)).
An initial objective of the Inquisition was to eliminate crypto-Judaism among the “New
Christians”. This group was composed mainly of Jews who converted to Christianity after 1391
when hundreds of Jews were killed in anti-Jewish riots. Many Jews were forced to convert while
others preempted attacks by converting voluntarily. Overall, about 50 percent of the Jewish
population of 200,000 had converted to Christianity by the early 15th century. In terms of our
model, the credible threat of a high penalty induced behavior consistent with conversion, however,
indistinguishable from crypto-Judaism. The Inquisition was to verify that these conversions were
real.
Our analysis (proposition 3) suggests that crypto-morality is more likely to occur if there
are signiﬁcant net gains from behaving as a Christian in public, yet the probability of detecting
crypto-Judaism is low. These conditions indeed prevailed prior to 1478 in the two Spanish
kingdoms that later became the Spain. Aragon had a Papal Inquisition and in Castile members
of the episcopate were charged with surveillance of the faithful and punishing heresy. Both
organizations could inﬂict heavy penalties but lacked the organizational capacity to detect hidden
transgressions. Moreover, Jews were institutionally discriminated against and were forbidden
from governmental positions (and, naturally, positions in the Church).
Indeed, crypto-Judaism was widely practiced. Even when those Jews who had been forced
to convert in 1391 were allowed to return to Judaism, many refused (e.g., Roth 1992). Crypto-
Judaism might have been facilitated in this historical episode by developments in Jewish theology.
In response to attacks on Jews in various European countries, this theological development bal-
anced two principles. The principle of Kiddush Hashem (“sanctiﬁcation of the name [of God]”)
calls for a Jew to sacriﬁce his life rather than desecrate God. The principle of Pikuach Nefesh
(“saving of human life”) asserts that the duty of saving life overrides any other religious consid-
eration.14 Maimonides, the prominent 12th century Jewish-Spanish scholar, concluded that if
12We use the term Spain for ease of presentation although for much of this period it was a union of two kingdoms,
Castile and Aragon. The discussion here is based mainly on Kamen 1997, Rawlings 2006, and Cecil 1975, 1996.
13The Inquisition increased the power of the Catholic clergy but not at the expense of the state (although it
became an inﬂuential organization within it). In Spain the Inquisition “was responsible to the Crown rather than
the Pope and was used to consolidate state interest” (Rawlings 2006, p. 1). More generally, “the papacy was
forced to grant the [Spanish] monarchs the power to nominate church oﬃcials and administer church beneﬁces
and to provide them with ﬁnancial contributions” (Gorski 2000, p. 157).
14With the exceptions of the three cardinal sins of defaming god’s name, murder, and forbidden sexual rela-
tionships.
15one transgressed on the principle of sanctiﬁcation then he is exempt from punishment if this was
done under duress and escape was not an option. Similarly favorable to crypto-Judaism is the
importance of private actions (φ close to 1) in practicing the faith. Praying, for example, can be
done anywhere and can be led by any individual.
Whether the authorities were aware of crypto-Judaism is unclear. In any case, they did not
acknowledge the practice prior to 1477 when the Queen received credible evidence to this eﬀect.
The following year the Pope permitted the Spanish king to create an Inquisition controlled by
the state rather then the papacy.15 The permission was given under the threat of withdrawing
Spanish military support of the papacy. Among the evidence suggesting that the Inquisition
served an important political role is that in 1484 the Pope allowed appeals to Rome against the
I n q u i s i t i o n .T h eS p a n i s hk i n gr e f u s e dt og i v eu po nh i sa u t h o r i t ya n dd e c r e e dd e a t ha n dw e a l t h
conﬁscation for anyone appealing without royal permission. Subsequently the Inquisition became
the only judicial authority operating throughout Spain and was a useful mechanism at the service
of the crown.
The Inquisition was created in 1478 and the ﬁrst executions took place in 1481 when six people
were burned at the stake. By 1492, tribunals operated in six cities. Detection of crypto-Judaism
by the Inquisition was facilitated by the concentration of the previously Jewish population in
mixed cities. The Inquisition solicited evidence from Old Christians under the threat of excom-
munication and trial for heresy. Inquiries were initiated based on testimonies concerning daily
activities associated with Judaism such as washing hands “too much,” replacing sheets on Friday,
or declining a pork dish.
An implication of our theoretical analysis is that when agents are heterogenous (section 2.6),
such an increase in the expected penalty should have two consequences. On one hand, some of
those practicing crypto-Judaism will convert Catholicism, while on the other hand, some of them
will return to Judaism. Intuitively, the higher expected punishment of crypto-Judaism rendered
it less attractive relative to the original faith. Indeed, some evidence suggests that there were
returns of crypto-Jews to their original faith. Interestingly, some Christians were so impressed
by the self-sacriﬁce of crypto-Jews that they too converted to Judaism.
This suggests that oblique socialization to Judaism hindered the ability of the Inquisition to
eliminate crypto-Judaism. Indeed, the Inquisition sought to eliminate the Spanish Jewish com-
munity altogether. This was, however, a costly proposition for the monarchy because the Jewish
community’s economic and other resources contributed to its ﬁght against Muslim Granada.
However, once this last Muslim kingdom was defeated in 1492, the monarchy ordered the Jews
to either convert to Christianity or leave. Most have left.
The Inquisition intensively pursued any suspicion of crypto-Judaism and by 1530 it had
already executed about 2,000 and imposed lesser penalties on perhaps as many as 15,000 others
(Rawlings 2006, p. 15). After 1520, the number of trials for crypto-Judaism declined substantially
15An inquisition was created in Castile and Aragon at diﬀerent times. We ignore such subtleties to simplify the
discussion.
16suggesting the impact of this brutal campaign on moral transition. The implied limits on Jewish
behavior seems to have led crypto-Jews to lose knowledge of how to practice their faith. It turns
out, however, that learning about the accusations leveled against those convicted of crypto-
Judaism was a means to regain this knowledge. Indeed, the Inquisition failed to bring a quick
end to crypto-Judaism and accusations continued for centuries. Between 1721 and 1725, for
example, about 900 people were charged and executed (Rawlings 2006, p. 71) and the last
execution took place in 1818 when Manuel Santiago Vivar was accused in Cordoba of keeping
the Jewish faith while being nominally a Christian. Consistent with our analysis, it seems that
secrecy and intense socialization let crypto-Jewish families persist for more than 300 years, after
which their share in the population was close to zero.
The methods used by the Inquisition gradually evolved in a manner consistent with our
analysis of the challenge that crypto-morality presents with respect to false accusations of people
following the desired morality (section 2.6). The penalty imposed by the Inquisition was very
high; painful death and conﬁscation of wealth following years of imprisonment without any
contact with the outside world. One was not entitled to a lawyer or to learning about who testiﬁed
against him. Torture was legally used to extract confessions. Punishments were inﬂicted in public
spectacles and announced ahead of time to attract attendance and foster deterrence. Moreover,
after 1550 the Inquisition had direct ﬁnancial interest in extracting confessions. Previously, the
wealth conﬁscated from those who were convicted went to the royal treasury and the Inquisition
was ﬁnanced by the state. By the mid 16th century, ﬁnancing the Inquisition became unproﬁtable
and the Crown demanded that it would become self-suﬃcient. Subsequently, the Inquisition kept
the wealth conﬁscated from those it had convicted.
Harsh punishment, however, would be counter-productive unless detection probability (e)
is suﬃciently high, and the probability of false detection (μ)i ss u ﬃciently low. Yet, whether
people believed in Judaism was not directly observed. Finding out what people privately prac-
ticed required relying on witnesses and providing them with the necessary incentives. Revealing
the witnesses’ identity or questioning their motives would have invited retaliations against the
witnesses and would undermine the ﬂow of information. Keeping their identity secret, however,
encouraged false accusations. Initially, the Inquisition failed to resolve the challenge of obtaining
suﬃciently accurate information. In early 16th century Cordoba, for example, 107 individuals
were burned alive on the charge of having been exposed to an address made by one accused of
promoting Judaism . Accusations were levied against prominent Christian ﬁgures such as the
Archbishop of Granada (Roth 1996, pp. 60-1).
The failure to obtain accurate information fostered political opposition against the Inquisition.
The New Christians appealed to the Pope and cities complained to the king that the Inquisition
infringed on their traditional legal rights. In 1518, when the king Charles V ﬁrst arrived to Spain
he was approached by the Cortes (the representative body) and the New Christians to restrict
the Inquisition. The latter group was particularly interested in abolishing the system of secret
accusations. Both groups also approached the Pope who was willing to grant these concessions.
17Charles V, nevertheless, refused to limit the Inquisition arguably because he was “convinced...
of the great political utility of the [Inquisition’s] Tribunals” (Ibid, p. 63).
At the same time, the Inquisition created the organizational capacity and procedures to reduce
the probability of false accusations. Upon arrest one was asked to provide a list of “enemies” who
might advance false accusations. If the secret ac c u s e rw a sn a m e da sa ne n e m y ,t h et e s t i m o n yw a s
invalidated and the accuser’s conduct was investigated. Torture was allowed only once (although
“breaks” could have been taken) and one who confessed under pressure had to also confess while
not under threat (reducing both true and false accusation probabilities).
Perhaps most importantly, the Inquisition developed a sophisticated system of collecting and
organizing information and often labored years to gather suﬃcient evidence prior to making
an arrest (e.g., Rawlings 2006, pp. 30-6). Gathering incriminating evidence became harder to
obtain as crypto-Judaism declined over time, and those practicing it became more secretive. The
Inquisition then resorted to using Jewish ancestry as indicating guilt, thus reducing the likelihood
of persecuting people with no Jewish heritage (reducing μ). This racial discrimination might have
alleviated the Old Christians’ fear of false accusation but reduced incentives to sincerely convert.
The histories of the Jews in Portugal and the Muslims in Spain similarly reveal the con-
tribution of crypto-morality to moral persistence. Speciﬁcally, these histories reveal that the
eﬀectiveness of crypto-morality depends on the intensity of preferences (section 2.6) and on the
probability of detection (proposition 4) respectively. As discussed above, Spaniard Jews who
refused to convert were allowed to emigrate. This, however, was not the case in Portugal where,
in 1497, every Jew was declared Christian.16 Moreover, this Jewish community included many
of the Spanish Jews who refused to accept Catholicism in 1492 and emigrated to Portugal. Our
analysis suggests that the stronger commitment to Judaism (higher value of ua
a −ua
b)a m o n gt h e
Portuguese New Christians would slow their moral transition.
Indeed, crypto-Judaism in Portugal survived to the twentieth century, although an Inquisition
was active since 1540. Moreover, thousands of New Christians emigrated to Amsterdam, the
Ottoman Empire, and other places in which they were permitted to openly return to Judaism.
Yet, crypto-Judaism was practiced in Portugal to the present. In the city of Belmonte about 300
crypto-Jews returned to publicly practice their faith since the1970s.
Similarly, the persistence of crypto-Islam among the previously Spanish Muslim population
is consistent with our claim that crypto-morality is slow to decay when detection is diﬃcult
and oblique socialization to the other morality is weak. In the early 17th century the Spanish
Muslim population of about 600,000 were forced to convert to Christianity. These moriscos
lived in separate communities mainly in Valencia (in the east) and Granada (in the south) It
16In 1496, the Portuguese king mandated that every Jew who did not convert should leave the country in ships
he would provide. The king’s objective seems to have been to induce conversion thereby keeping the valuable
Jewish community while satisfying a pre-condition to marrying the heiress of the future united crown of Spain.
Among the means used by the king was torture and capturing and baptizing Jewish children. Most Jews, however,
refused to convert but when arrived to be deported at the port in Lisbon in 1497, they were baptized without
their consent and declared Christians. See, e.g., Roth 1996.
18is reasonable that the moriscos’ isolation and concentration reduced the detection probability,
fostered oblique socialization to crypto-Islam, and substantially reduced oblique socialization to
Christianity. Moreover, the moriscos had a higher reproduction rate. Population growth rate was
70 percent between 1565 and 1609 compared to 35 percent among the Old Christians in the same
regions (Rawlings 2006, p. 81). The theory of socialization that we adopt from Bisin and Verdier
(2001) indeed predicts a higher reproduction rate by cultural minority groups. The Inquisition
seems to have recognized that these factors undermined its ability to induce a moral transition.
It advocated eliminating the moriscos and rumors of their alleged support to a Turkish invasion
of Spain added weight to this proposal. In 1609 king Philip III ordered the moriscos to leave
Spain and by 1614 their emigration was completed.
The Inquisition’s mixed record in inﬂuencing the morality of the Spanish Christian population
similarly reveals the importance of crypto-morality in moral persistence. Christians constituted
the single largest group among those brought to trial by the Inquisition although punishments
were generally lighter. Between 1540 and 1700 about 30,000 people were accused of major or
m i n o rh e r e s i e st h a th a dn o t h i n gt od ow i t hJ u d a i sm or Islam. The most common major heresy was
Protestantism (particularly Lutheranism) and the most common minor heresies were outbursts
against the faith, bigamy, and sexual misconduct by priests in the intimacy of the confession.
The Inquisition succeeded in inﬂuencing morality among Christians only with respect to heresies
in which the detection probability was relatively high.
Suspects in the major heresy of Protestantism were easy to detect because the movement
originated outside Spain. The Inquisition suspected any Spanish scholars who visited Protestant
countries and everyone who came from them. Protestantism, indeed did not establish itself in
Spain. The Inquisition seems to have been able to similarly eradicate the minor heresies whose
number (which we can measure only by accusations) declined dramatically after 1615.17
Upon close inspection, however, the Inquisition’s success was mixed at best. It had diﬃculty
in verifying ignorance of the Catholic faith or detecting sex among unmarried individuals. To
verify ignorance, the Inquisition relied on signals of religious beliefs such as knowledge of the
prayers (1565), history of church attendance (1570) and knowledge of the Ten Commandments
(1574). Indeed, the number of defendants who could recite the four main prayers (Pater, Ave,
Credo, and Salve) increased from 37 percent (prior to 1550) to 82 percent (1600-50). Yet, these
signals can be easily jammed and it is diﬃcult to know whether this increase in knowledge was
associated with a moral transition. Indeed, in 1570 the Bishop of Mallorca did not complain
about Church attendance but instead that his parishioners were late attending Masses, paid
little attention, and left early (Rawlings 2006, pp. 115-6). More generally “we might further
question the extent to which... the Inquisition actually... change[d] attitudes and behavioral
practices that had prevailed over centuries” among Old Christians (ibid, p. 120). This outcome
is consistent with our analysis that high initial prevalence of a moral trait and low probability of
17The average annual number of heresies cases of this nature declined from about 516 (1560 to 1614) to about
170 (1615-1700). (Rawlings 2006, p. 115).
19detection facilitate its perpetuation in hostile institutional environment.
Ineﬀectiveness in inducing morality was indeed one of the arguments advanced by the oppo-
nents of the Inquisition by the late 18th century. The argument was that secularism was now
challenging the faith. The Church had to win unbelievers rather than correct those who have
wrong religious beliefs. Detecting the lack of beliefs, rather than identifying those practicing
ad i ﬀerent religion was beyond the Inquisition’s ability. In this context, discrimination against
Spaniards of Jewish ancestry was particularly counter-productive. It punished those who adopted
the Catholic faith rather those who rejected it. The Catholic church had to convince the unbe-
lievers. Indeed, by 1834 the Inquisition was terminated and the Jesuit Order that is dedicated
to evangelization through education took the lead in gaining believers.
3.2 Schooling: Republican morality in France and Turkey
In Europe and the Middle East, religious authorities had traditionally controlled the education
system and used it to socialize the next generation to accept the moral superiority of their norms.
In particular, the education system had been used to legitimize the existing political orders. In
Europe, for example, the Christian denomination aﬃliated with a state, such as Catholicism
in France and Anglicanism in England, also controlled the education system. When secular
forces gained political power on the eve of the modern period, they sought to similarly use
the educational system to foster the morality they adhered to. Secular states took control of the
education system and students were then socialized to the moral superiority of their underpinning
principles such as freedom of expression, universal franchise, and majority rule.
Indeed, after the French Revolution, for example, the revolutionaries established teachers’
training schools with the explicit objective of advancing “republican morality” in contrast to
the traditional morality advocated in the previously Catholic schooling system. Napoleon has
noted that “of all our institutions public education is the most important.... it is essential [for]
... the morals and political ideas of the generation which is now growing up” (Molé 1923, p.
61). During the 1880s, Jules Ferry, the Minister of Public Instruction ﬁnalized the creation of
France’s Republican school system which still maintains a separation between the state and the
Church.
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father of the Turkish Republic, similarly viewed educa-
tion as crucial for the perpetuation of a secular, modern state. Islam had previously constituted
the backbone of the education system in the Ottoman Empire although during the 19th century,
professional schools for engineering, military, and medicine were established. The Kemalists,
however, sought to create a national educational system emphasizing nationalism while elimi-
nating much of the Islamic content. The reforms were comprehensive and included placing all
private and religious schools under the authority of the Ministry of National Education. This
ministry also trained the religious scholars, controlled the educational budget, and dictated the
20curriculum.18
The similar educational reforms in France and Turkey, however, had diﬀerent outcomes.
France was relatively successful in using the educational system and other means to foster Re-
publicanism. Religion is still not taught in the French public school system and only 13 percent
of the French consider religion to be very important in their lives (WVS 2006, V9). In contrast,
the school system that was set up in Turkey in 1927, did not remain purely secular for long.
The teaching of religion has been reintroduced in 1949 and currently, a high school graduate has
eight years of religion courses. More than 74 percent of the Turks consider religion to be very
important in their lives (WVS 2007, V9).The electoral success of Islamic parties in Turkey after
2002 also reveals this attitude.
These diﬀerential outcomes reveal the diﬃculty of changing moral standards when inaction
is uninformative about one’s true morality. Moreover, our theory of moral persistence suggests
that these outcomes may have been due to distinct initial distributions of moral attitudes and the
initial increase in parental socialization when indoctrination is introduced (proposition 2). Indeed,
prior to the French Revolution, the Church had been a privileged component of a political system
that many Frenchmen, particularly the bourgeoisie, resented. Revolts by those who supported
the nobility and/or the church were brutally suppressed. Once the monarchy was defeated, the
church became the main alternative. Yet, large fractions of the French population resented it
because of the gap between the values promoted by the Church (humility, poverty, etc.) and
its behavior during the Ancien Regime. In sharp contrast, the Turkish Republic was created
by a relatively small nationalist elite, while most Turks probably did not resent Islam or its
organizations. Indeed, Islamic organizations were in charge of providing social services such as
schooling and charity under the Ottomans
At least two pieces of evidence suggest that, in Turkey, vertical (parental) socialization was
eﬀective in countering oblique socialization by the secular educational system. In the 1970s,
anti-Western, pro-Islamic parties entered the Turkish electoral scene, creating a political crisis.
A military coup in 1980 restored a secular government. But it became widely accepted that
Islam is the only eﬀective means to maintain unity in Turkey, bridging political, social, and
economic rifts. In 1982 classes in religious culture and ethics became mandatory. Additional
piece of evidence of the importance of vertical socialization is the increase in the number of
parents choosing Imam-Hatip schools for their children. These vocational religious schools were
ﬁnanced by donations, controlled by the state, and also provided general education. The ﬁrst
seven schools were established in 1951, by 1971 there were 71 schools, by 1997 there were 600
schools with 10 percent of the student population. Most graduates pursued a secular career.
Thus, parents were seeking an alternative oblique socialization that emphasized Islam.19
18The discussion is based mainly on Keyman 2007 and Pak 2004.
19See Pak 2004. In 1999 graduates were restricted to subsequently enrol only in faculties of Divinity. This
caused a steep decline in their popularity.
213.3 Political legitimacy in China and the Middle East
Our theory of moral persistence in a hostile institutional environment suggests that power may
have limited impact on political legitimacy. The probability of detecting political crypto-morality
is low because it is inherently diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate whether one who is not politically active
rejects the legitimacy of the political authority. After all, political crypto-morality entails taking
the same actions, such as paying taxes, that are taken by those who accept the authority’s
legitimacy. It is in time of crisis, such as a revolution or an invasion, that the rejection of
an authority’s legitimacy manifests itself. Recall, for example, that the Iraqi army during the
Second Gulf War, by and large, did not ﬁght to save the dictator they previously seemed to have
supported.
Our conclusion that power may have limited impact on political legitimacy is at odds with
prevailing thought in political economy. At least since Karl Marx it is commonly assumed
that political authorities can eﬀectively use their power to gain legitimacy. As a consequence,
legitimacy is hardly discussed in political science and political economy and is widely neglected.20
We do not dispute that power is an eﬀective means of control but argue that legitimacy is
important as well.
The word legitimacy is derived from the Latin word legitimus, meaning lawful and according
to law. The contemporary meaning, and the one we employ is broader, however. Weber, for
example, distinguished between traditional (habit-based), charismatic (personal) and legal (ra-
tional) legitimacy. But even this classiﬁcation has been considered to narrow (e.g., Zhao 2009).
For the purpose of our analysis, a political authority is legitimate when people feel morally obliged
to follow its rules and laws (Greif 2001, 2010). People hold moral standards that specify who
has political legitimacy. To gain legitimacy, therefore, the political authority has to comply with
these moral standards. Moral standards have been, for example, the divine right of kings, having
the right ancestry, being fairly elected, exercising due process, and pursuing a particular policy
to name a few. An authority’s political legitimacy can rest on more than one moral standard
and can change over time. Yet, in a given society, some moral standards are likely to be more
prominent in specifying political legitimacy.
In favor of our position that legitimacy matters, the strategists of the Chinese Communist
Party [CCP] have recently concluded that “the deep reason for the disintegration of the Soviet
Union lies in the exhaustion of political legitimacy” (Gilley 2008, p. 271). In other words,
the regime that has the strongest incentives to understand the demise of the USSR points to
legitimacy as a crucial factor. The communists’ monopoly over coercive and economic powers
did not entail gaining legitimacy. The Chinese strategists also concluded that using brute force is
counterproductive. “In reviewing the lessons of the collapse of the Soviet Union, CCP strategists
increasingly point not to the dangers of releasing repressive controls but to the dangers of relying
on them in the ﬁrst place” (ibid.).
20For example, the term ‘legitimacy’ has only 6 index entries and very little discussion in the New Handbook
of Political Science (Goodin and Klingemann 1996).
22We concur with the CCP strategists and demonstrate the generality of their conclusions by
evaluating the observable implications of our analysis. Speciﬁcally, our analysis implies long
episodes of stability in political philosophy, policies aimed at satisfying traditional pre-requisites
for political legitimacy, and the loss of political authority when conditions for legitimacy are not
met. In the language of our model, a political ruler may continue to promote and choose actions
consistent with morality a to gain the support of the majority a-types, even when diﬀerent views
will serve him better. Indeed, the evidence conﬁrms these predictions.
In pre-modern China, for example, political legitimacy has been based on the “Mandate of
Heaven”: Heaven would bless a just ruler with peace and prosperity. Military defeats, invasions,
ﬂoods, famines, and similar disasters reveal the end of a mandate and the right to revolt. Good
performance bestows political legitimacy. The mythology attributes the concept to the Duke of
Zhou who, about 3000 years ago, invented it to justify overthrowing an ineﬀective ruling dynasty
that had claimed a divine origin. The principle of the Mandate of Heaven had become a constant
feature in Chinese political philosophy and the Duke’s own dynasty was subsequently overthrown
in a revolt justiﬁed by it.
Indeed, regardless of their dynastic aﬃliations, subsequent Chinese emperors refrained from
using force to impose moral standards justifying the legitimacy of their speciﬁc dynasties. Rather,
they pursued policies consistent with the objective of demonstrating having a Mandate of Heaven.
Speciﬁcally, they seem to have been responsive to being evaluated by their accomplishments and
not by alternatives measures such as birth rights or compliance with a particular decision-making
process.
Chinese rulers, much more than the Europeans’, were active in promoting prosperity. They
ﬁnanced the discovery of new agricultural techniques, which they then distributed throughout
the Empire (Mokyr 1990). Moreover, from 1085 AD to 1776 AD tax rates were generally lower in
China than in Europe and real tax per-capita declined by perhaps as much as 85 percent.21 The
Chinese state also invested heavily in ﬂood control, gave tax relief during famines, and intervened
counter-cyclically in the grain market.22
In the early modern period, however, the Chinese emperors failed to eﬀectively respond
to challenges posed by the military and economic rise of the West. This performance failure
contributed to the collapse of China’s last dynasty and eventually to the rise of Mao’s communist
regime in 1949. The legitimacy of the Maoist regime was based on the communist ideology and,
to a larger extent, on Mao’s personal charisma. “The Chinese had such blind faith in Mao and
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that they tried to follow the party line frequently at the
expense of their own well-being. ... Millions of people died tragically during Mao’s era, but most
Chinese trusted Mao and believed that those tragedies, including their own suﬀering, were the
21For taxation see Liu (2005), table 3.3, p. 90. Rosenthal and Wong (2006) argued that Europe’s higher taxation
was due to political fragmentation. Yet, political fragmentation is endogenous to legitimacy norms (Greif, 2008).
22E.g., Shiue 2005. In the world value survey (2007), http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org, 29.6% of the Chinese
respondents view subsidizing the poor an essential part of democracy . In the US (2006) the number was only
6.6%.
23necessary costs on the road to paradise” (Zhao 2009, p. 422).
Following the death of Mao in 1976, the party could no longer rely on his personal charisma.
Furthermore, economic conditions deteriorated. There were widespread earthquakes and agricul-
tural output was hit by a drought. GDP per capita declined in real terms by 1.6%. Following
1979 the economic situation began to improve due to the economic reforms initiated by the CCP,
that by now have led to the so called “socialist market economy”. Yet, the reforms provided
better information about the low prosperity of China relative to the West. As a consequence, the
promise of the communist agenda was undermined, contributing to the rise of the pro-democracy
movement in the late 1980s. The violent confrontation with the pro-democracy movement in
1989 seems to have revealed to the CCP the need to strengthen their legitimacy.
To strengthen their legitimacy, the CCP began complying with the demands of the traditional
performance-based Mandate of Heaven (Zhao 2009). Following 1989, nationalism has been pro-
moted to portray the government as a defender of the nation. The central government began to
be active in eradicating corruption and highlighting its role as protecting the people from local
bureaucracy. Previously, corruption was tolerated. The CCP now promotes concepts such as
the ‘Three Representatives’ and ‘Harmonious Society’ that emphasize its duty to foster welfare.
This duty, according to the CCP-controlled media is “the foundation of the Party, the basis of
government legitimacy and the sources of state authority” (ibid, p. 426). Indeed, contempo-
rary Chinese rely on outcomes — security and prosperity — to evaluate their leadership rather
than possible alternatives such as social justice or adherence to a democratic political process.23
Political legitimacy is still sought based on the Mandate of Heaven.
In contrast to China, political legitimacy in the Muslim Middle East has traditionally been
faith-based (Lewis, 1991; Greif 2001). Faith-based legitimacy was inspired by the Qur’anic verse
“Obey God, obey His Prophet, and obey those in authority over you” (IV, 59). The theological
and popular interpretations of this and similar verses have been that a Muslim should obey
those with the power to rule as long as they serve Islam. It is a sin to disobey a Muslim ruler
who follows, protects, and promotes the faith. It is also a sin, however, to obey him if his orders
contradict the teachings of Islam. Using force to overthrow a ruler who betrayed Islam is justiﬁed
(e.g., Qur’an XXVI, 150—2). The Prophet Muhammad set a precedent by revolting against the
un-Islamic rulers of Mecca.
Indeed, revolts in the name of Islam have been, and still are, common in the Muslim Middle
East. An example is the rise of the House of Saud, the rulers of much of the Arabian Peninsula
23http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. In China, 22.7% of the respondents viewed strong defense force as their
country’s most important goal. This percentage is much lower in each of the other powers in the region (Japan,
8.7%.; South Korea, 7%; Indonesia, 6%; Vietnam, 11.6; India, 14.3%). Not surprisingly, however, the objective
of economic growth was ranked high in all these countries. The evaluation of the government in China by its
accomplishments rather than the process is supported by the observation that only 8.1% of Chinese considered
increased political participation as the most important national task. The average in the other regional powers is
15.4%. In China, only 5% selected protection of free speech as their ﬁrst choice personal aim versus 17.8% in the
US (2006).
24(hence the name Saudi Arabia). In 1744 they adopted the teachings of al-Wahhab (1703-92),
according to which the traditional rulers of Mecca and Medina were illegitimate because they
did not follow the appropriate path of Islam. Osama Bin Laden has similarly claimed that the
Saudis lost their legitimate right to rule because they violated an explicit Islamic prohibition to
allow non-Muslims (i.e., US troops) to live in Saudi Arabia.
To gain faith-based legitimacy rulers in the Middle East have used various means to demon-
strate their devotion to the cause of the faith. Late 18th century Algiers, for example, had 104
mosques that were mostly built overtime by various rulers. About six percent of the adult Mus-
lim population worked in these establishments (Abun-Nasr 1987, p. 162). For comparison, only
one percent of the adult population held equivalent jobs in the diocese of Paris about this time
(Mousnier 1979, p. 319). Policy-makers expressed their devotion in ways other than co-optation.
For example, lending at interest was customary among the Turkish people and it was initially
maintained in the Ottoman Empire. When the Ottomans turned from conquering Byzantium to
conquering the Muslim Middle-East, however, they restricted such lending to placate the Muslim
religious scholars.
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire during World War I led to a moral dissonance in the
Middle East. This collapse invalidated the premise that following Islam is a key to personal and
communal success (Lewis, 1991). Secular moral entrepreneurs, such as Gamal Abdel Nassar who
became the president of Egypt and Michel Aﬂaq the ideological founder of the Baath parties that
captured power in Syria (1963 - ) and Iraq (1968-2003) and advocated a socialist Arab nationalist
movement to unify all Arab countries. Yet, faith-based legitimacy remained a potent force in the
Muslim Middle East. For example, the Arab Republic of Syria has no oﬃcial state religion, yet
Islam is the declared foundation of the legal system. Similarly, the Egyptian 1971 constitution
deﬁnes the state as “a Socialist Democratic State,” in which, nevertheless, “the principal source of
legislation is the Shari’ah.” The contemporary importance of faith-based legitimacy also reveals
itself in the fact that faith-based challenges appeared in the Islamic world shortly after the end
of colonialism. As early as 1928 the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood that emerged in Egypt
challenged the legitimacy of the state on this ground and advocated reorganizing Egypt as an
Islamic state. It quickly spread to Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, and North Africa.
We argued that the Communist Party in China transitioned to seek legitimacy by advancing
policies consistent with the traditional moral basis of political legitimacy. In contrast, rulers in
the Muslim Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have pursued policies that do not conform
to the traditional moral basis of political legitimacy. Be the causes undermining these policy
choices be as they may, they have a clear empirical implication. Political legitimacy in China
should be higher than predicted after controlling of other economic, social, and political factors
while legitimacy in the MENA should be lower. This is exactly the ﬁnding in a cross-country
econometric analysis of 72 countries (Gilley 2006) China ranks 13 in term of its political legiti-
macy and it is an outlier while the MENA countries have low legitimacy ranking. Morocco rank
of 32 is the highest and it is followed by Egypt in the 40th place.
254 Concluding comments
Identifying the micro-level mechanisms that contribute to moral persistence is crucial for un-
derstanding dynamics of political and economic outcomes. Recent important contributions have
focused on the complementary relations between institutions and morality in democracies.24 The
majority chooses institutions that foster the morality they hold. In particular, these institutions
foster the majority’s morality by rewarding those who practice it, or socialize their children to
hold it. The impact of institutions on moral dynamics is therefore a by-product of the political
process. Moral persistence is thus due to the complementary relations between the dominant
morality, the rules governing political decision-making, and decisions regarding behavior and
socialization.
In contrast, this paper focuses on the micro-level mechanisms that contribute to moral per-
sistence when institutions are designed to directly inﬂuence moral dynamics, and not just reﬂect
the morality of the majority. Whether such institutions can inﬂuence moral dynamics and moral
persistence depends on the individual’s ability to de-couple morality from behavior. Moral be-
liefs are inherently unobservable and behavior can be strategically chosen in hostile institutional
environments to disguise one’s true morality. When such crypto-morality is eﬀectively practiced,
behavior corresponds to the institutionally promoted morality but morality itself does not. A
behavioral transition, rather than a moral transition transpires. Crypto-morality enables moral
persistence in hostile institutional environments.
Our model highlights the diﬀerences between the factors contributing to cultural diversity
(Bisin and Verdier 2000, 2001) and the factors contributing to the more general phenomenon
of moral persistence. Equilibrium cultural diversity is the centerpiece of Bisin and Verdier’s
models, and it is a consequence of endogenous socialization by families. Our focus is not on the
interplay and socialization decisions between individuals of diﬀerent cultures, but instead is on
the interaction between the institutional environment and socialization decisions. Speciﬁcally,
we considered the impact of incentives provided by the political authority and of indoctrination
on socialization decisions. This lead us to explore such issues as the monitoring technology of
ac o e r c i v ep o w e r ,t h ee ﬀective range of possible penalties, the relationship between public and
private actions in the exercise of moralities, the externalities of the minority’s persecution on
the majority, the relative beneﬁts of indoctrination over coercive sanctions, and the possible
political conﬂicts over controlling indoctrinating institutions. Equally important, our analysis
highlights the persistence of political legitimacy and exposes the micro-mechanisms that hinder
upon political transitions.
While our theoretical analysis highlights the role played by crypto-morality, it is but a ﬁrst step
towards a better understanding of moral persistence. Several issues demand further exploration.
First, we abstract from directly modelling the preferences of the political authority, including a
more detailed account of the costs and beneﬁts of various institutions. Second, we have no role
24See, e.g., Benabou and Tirole (2006), Tabellini (2008).
26for communities and community leaders in our analysis. Third, we ignore the interplay between
the distribution of moralities, their persistence, and their inﬂuence on competition for political
legitimacy.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: In the unique interior SSE, (2) implies that H0(τa)=H0(τb). From
the FOCs (8) and (9) it follows that the SSE characterizing qπ satisﬁes (1−qπ)(∆u−π)=
qπ(∆u − π), from which we obtain the proposition. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: Comparing the FOC in (11) to that of the benchmark case (5), it is
easy to see that the right-hand side is larger in (11) for any qt.S i n c eH(·) is increasing and
strictly convex this implies that the level of τa that solves (11) is larger than the level that
solves (5). Turning to a b morality parent, their children will be indoctrinated at school to
be socialized to b with probability 1, and as a consequence they invest in no socialization
at home and τb =0 . As for the transition dynamics, the assumptions on H(·) guarantee
that the solution to (11) results in some unique τa ∈ (0,1), and the transition dynamics in
(10) imply that limt→∞ qt =0 .¥
Proof of Proposition 3: If π ∈ (πc,π] then a-types choose c and b types choose b. Using this
to obtain the correct expected utility functions for parents leads to the FOCs (13) and
(14) as described above. In the unique interior SSE, (2) still applies and it implies that
H0(τa)=H0(τb). From the FOCs (13) and (14) it follows that the SSE characterizing qc
satisﬁes φ(1 − qc)(ua
c − u)=φqc(u − ub
c), from which we obtain the characterization of
qc = q∗, and the solutions for τa and τb follow. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof is an immediate consequence of Propositions 1 and 3. ¥
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